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TRESPASS TO CULTURE: THE BIOETHICS OF 
INDIGENOUS POPULATIONS’ INFORMED CONSENT IN 
MAINSTREAM GENETIC RESEARCH PARADIGMS 
Alexandra Winters* 
I. Introduction 
Today, genetic research is considered of vital importance in the fight 
against many diseases.1 Researchers use genes to study diseases such as 
diabetes, asthma, and leukemia.2 The indigenous populations of the world 
are often identified as ideal sample populations for these studies because of 
their isolation and the effect that isolation has on their genetic structure.3 
The benefits of this research are significant, but new questions have arisen 
regarding the rights of DNA donors, particularly in light of the case of 
Henrietta Lacks and her HeLa cells, which were harvested without her 
knowledge or consent and are now mass produced—an “immortal cell 
line”.4 
Such questions are difficult at the best of times, but doubly so in the case 
of indigenous participants.5 Standard frameworks of research and informed 
consent in the United States were not designed to accommodate indigenous 
                                                                                                                 
 * First-place winner, 2015-2016 American Indian Law Review Writing Competition. 
J.D., 2016, University of Dayton School of Law; M.S.W., 2014, Ohio University; B.A., 
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 1. See Charles Weijer & James A. Anderson, A Critical Appraisal of Protections for 
Aboriginal Communities in Biomedical Research, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 187, 187 (2002); see 
also Bette Jacobs, Jason Roffenbender, Jeff Collmann, Kate Cherry, LeManuel L. Bitsoi, 
Kim Bassett & Charles H. Evans, Jr., Bridging the Divide Between Genomic Science and 
Indigenous Peoples, 38 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 684, 684 (2010) (discussing the history of 
biomedical research among indigenous populations).  
 2. See Weijer & Anderson, supra note 1, at 187.  
 3. See Charles Pensabene, A Canyon Full of Woes: The Havasupai Tribe Illustrates the 
Need for Cultural Competency in Genetic Research, 7 ALB. GOV’T. L. REV. 637, 649-50 
(2014). 
 4. See Joan L. McGregor, Genome Justice: Genetics and Group Rights: Population 
Genomics and Research Ethics with Socially Identifiable Groups, 35 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 
356, 356-57 (2007); see also Deleso A. Alford, HeLa Cells and Unjust Enrichment in the 
Human Body, 21 ANN. HEALTH L. 223, 223-36 (2012) (discussing unjust enrichment and 
debated property rights in the body).  
 5. For the purposes of this paper, I will focus primarily on the difficulties faced by the 
Native American tribes of the United States, but I will use the term “indigenous” to include 
both Native Americans and international native populations.  
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peoples, and as a result, the field of bioethics has so far allowed their cases 
to slip through the cracks.6 In the United States, the history of oppression 
that has followed the Native American tribes has now been compounded 
with instances of misuse of tribal DNA donated for research.7 If 
researchers’ goal is to continue genetic research in the pursuit of improved 
medical knowledge, the alienation of potential allies is a flawed approach.  
This paper discusses bioethics as applied to indigenous communities and 
advocates for culturally competent informed consent procedures in genetic 
research. Section II will discuss the field of bioethics and the foundation for 
the current system. Section III will focus on relevant examples of failed 
informed consent with indigenous tribes. Section IV will address tribal 
sovereignty as the foundation for future paradigms of informed consent. 
Section V provides suggested methods for correcting the deficiencies in the 
current informed consent procedures by applying principles of tribal 
sovereignty.  
II. Background 
Bioethics, specifically informed consent, has its modern origins in the 
Belmont Report.8 The Nuremburg Code, stemming from principles stated in 
the Hippocratic Oath, was developed in response to the human 
experimentation performed under the Nazi regime in World War II.9 The 
Code provides fundamental rights to research subjects and requires 
voluntary consent from the subjects, as well as the subjects’ ability to 
choose freely whether or not to participate in research.10 The Code also 
calls for details of potential risks and benefits, avoiding unnecessary pain 
                                                                                                                 
 6. See McGregor, supra note 4, at 361; see also Weijer & Anderson, supra note 1, at 
188.  
 7. See, e.g., Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
2008).  
 8. See Pensabene, supra note 3, at 646.  
 9. See Adam H. Laughton, Somewhere to Run, Somewhere to Hide?: International 
Regulation of Human Subject Experimentation, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L. L. 181, 183-84 
(2007).  
 10. See McGregor, supra note 4, at 360 (“The Code states subjects ‘should have 
sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the elements of the subject matter involved so 
he can make an informed and enlightened decision.’”); see also Laughton, supra note 9, at 
192 (“[T]he Common Rule requires that researchers secure the informed consent of the 
subject by providing subjects with a statements that the study involves research, the 
purpose(s) of the research, and the procedure(s) involved in the research.”). 
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and suffering, qualified researchers, and the ability to withdraw from the 
project whenever the participant chooses.11 
The Belmont Report was released in 197912 after the Tuskegee study 
scandal. The Report was premised on researcher respect when designing a 
project concerning genetic research.13 The foundation of respect led to the 
formation of the “Common Rule.”14 The Common Rule demands informed 
consent from research participants through statements that specify that the 
study involves research, identifies the purpose of the research, and details 
any risks or benefits.15  
The participants are also supposed to be provided with a statement of 
confidentiality, information about how any records are made during the 
course of the research, and information regarding means of identifying the 
participant.16 The researcher is obligated to inform the participants of any 
significant findings that may bear on the participants’ willingness to 
continue in the study.17 Despite these protections, the Common Rule was 
only designed to protect living human beings, not any genetic materials that 
have been separated from their hosts.18 
A. The Traditional Approach Under Moore 
The question of protecting genetic materials has now created much 
discussion. Debate arose in light of Moore v. Regents of the University of 
California19 as many states follow the rule of law established in that case, 
while the rest adopt the genetic research approach that supports the 
principles developed in both the Nuremburg Code and the Belmont Report.  
While this debate continues, it is undeniable that the majority of states 
follow Moore. Although approaches to donor rights over their DNA are 
slowly changing, the traditional perspective in mainstream research 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See McGregor, supra note 4, at 360. 
 12. See Laughton, supra note 9, at 187. 
 13. See Pensabene, supra note 3, at 646.  
 14. Id. at 646-47. 
 15. See Pensabene, supra note 3, at 647; see also Katherine Drabiak-Syed, Lessons from 
Havasupai Tribe v. Arizona State University Board of Regents: Recognizing Group, 
Cultural, and Dignitary Harms as Legitimate Risks Warranting Integration into Research 
Practice, 6 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 175, 198 (2010) (discussing the collection 
framework for human biological materials).  
 16. See Pensabene, supra note 3, at 647.  
 17. Id.  
 18. See Drabiak-Syed, supra note 15, at 199. 
 19. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120 (Cal. 1990), cert. denied, 499 
U.S. 936 (1991).  
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assumes that donors have no property rights over genetic materials given 
for research.20 No rights signifies no compensation and no recognition.21 In 
fact, it is all too easy to ignore the DNA contribution altogether, leaving 
pharmaceutical companies and research firms to pocket the revenues, the 
respect, and the limelight.  
In Moore, the plaintiff (John Moore) was diagnosed with hairy-cell 
leukemia and in the course of treatment had his spleen removed.22 
Following his surgery, researchers used his diseased spleen to create and 
patent a cell line without his consent.23 Outraged, Moore claimed he never 
gave permission for his tissues to be used in this fashion and believed that 
the researchers had deceived him in his treatment so they could gain 
financially.24  
The California Supreme Court, however, disagreed that Moore had a 
property interest in his tissues and held that recognizing such interests 
would stint medical progress.25 Consequently, Moore has become the 
dominant legal standard regarding ownership of genetic materials,26 
solidifying that intellectual property law supports the practice of denying 
donor ownership and patent rights. 
It is also noteworthy that the court held that the researchers had not 
obtained informed consent and they should have disclosed their plans for 
financial gain through use of Moore’s tissues.27 Others have called for 
better communication, including informed consent agreements with donors, 
so that donors understand how their materials will be used and what their 
rights are at all stages.28 Such a practice would be consistent with the 
mandates of the Nuremberg Code and the Belmont Report.29  
                                                                                                                 
 20. See Gary E. Marchant, Property Rights and Benefit-Sharing for DNA Donors?, 45 
JURIMETRICS J. 153, 155 (2005).  
 21. See id.  
 22. Moore, 51 Cal. at 124-27; see also Marchant, supra note 20, at 156.  
 23. Moore, 51 Cal. at 124-27; see also Marchant, supra note 20, at 156.  
 24. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120 (Cal. 1990); see also 
Marchant, supra note 20, at 157.  
 25. Moore, 51 Cal. at 146-47; see also Marchant, supra note 20, at 157.  
 26. See Marchant, supra note 20, at 157.  
.nd.chase price he had already parm?uation 
, Ernie is entitled to the value he put in into the land.chase price he had already p 27.
Moore, 51 Cal. at 148; see also Marchant, supra note 20, at 157 (“The court did . . . hold in 
favor of Moore that he had plead a valid cause of action on his alternative claim that the 
researchers failed to obtain adequate informed consent . . . by not disclosing their potential 
financial interest in Moore’s cells.”).  
 28. See Marchant, supra note 20, at 163 (“Genetic researchers will hopefully . . . 
provide better communication and express agreements with DNA donors about how their 
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Informed consent is comprised of both individual self-determination and 
respect.30 In terms of human research and participants, informed consent 
occurs “when it is given by a person who understands the purpose and 
nature of the study, what participation in the study requires the person to do 
and to risk, and what benefits are intended to result from the study.”31 This 
definition, however widely recognized, does not adequately address 
indigenous populations32 because it takes an individualistic approach, 
whereas many indigenous cultures operate on a community-based 
approach.33 
B. The Property Rights Approach 
The traditional paradigm of genetic ownership is slowly changing and 
proponents of donor rights in a growing number of jurisdictions have made 
some headway in gaining recognition. The Human Genome Diversity 
Project, for example, acknowledges and supports a duty to share benefits 
with DNA donors.34 The Human Genome Organization has also adopted a 
“Statement on Benefit-Sharing” which advocates for sharing benefits of 
research with the research participants.35  
Certain states, such as Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Alaska, and 
Louisiana, have enacted laws that define genetic information as personal 
property.36 In those states, a plaintiff can file a conversion claim because 
their genetic material would be considered personal property, whereas John 
Moore was barred from a conversion claim because the Court ruled he had 
no ownership right in his genetic materials.37 
                                                                                                                 
genetic material will be used in research, including any potential plans to claim intellectual 
property rights.”).  
 29. See discussion supra Part II.  
 30. See Constance MacIntosh, Indigenous Self-Determination and Research on Human 
Genetic Material: A Consideration of the Relevance of Debates on Patents and Informed 
Consent, and the Political Demands on Researchers, 13 HEALTH L.J. 213, 236 (2005).  
 31. Id. (quoting 1991 International Guidelines for Ethical Review of Epidemiological 
Studies, COUNCIL FOR INT’L ORGS. OF MED. SCI., http://www.cioms.ch/publications/guide 
lines/1991_texts_of_guidelines.htm). 
 32. See MacIntosh, supra note 30, at 236.  
 33. See id.; see also Drabiak-Syed, supra note 15, at 209. 
 34. See Marchant, supra note 20, at 159. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See id. at 160-61; see also Genetic Privacy Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. 
LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/genetic-privacy-laws.aspx (last visited 
June 24, 2015). 
 37. See Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 136-37 (Cal. 1990).  
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The clash between the traditional individual approach and the property 
rights approach has always been about donor rights versus scientific 
progress, and the “blind promotion of scientific research.”38 As mentioned 
above, genetic research has become incredibly important in the fight against 
certain diseases, but restrictions on scientific development are prevalent.39 
Budgets are limited, as is time, and it is understandable that further 
restrictions are a frustration to researchers.40 Some researchers argue that 
diverting limited funds to compensate DNA donors would be yet another 
restriction.41 
Unfortunate as delays may be, they are necessary because they conform 
to the Nuremberg Code and the Belmont Report by ensuring both 
participants’ fundamental rights and that voluntary consent stems from a 
thorough understanding of the research.42 DNA donors should be able to 
understand why researchers, companies, and educational institutions need 
their tissues and why it is going to grant those researchers and companies so 
much money. As researchers argue, it is true that donors will share the 
benefits of any discoveries made, but they also bear a significant risk for 
invasion of privacy and misuse of their DNA.43  
Proponents of a property rights approach note that if DNA were 
considered property, donors could pursue redress under the tort of 
conversion since a researcher’s use of the genetic material could be 
inconsistent with the owner’s property rights.44 The threat of a tort would 
provide an incentive for a more collaborative approach with donors, and in 
the case of indigenous populations, would provide some protection for their 
cultural beliefs and practices.45 One scholar, however, believes that a more 
effective means of achieving that goal is through a culturally competent 
informed consent process.46 The informed consent process, he states, allows 
for contractual remedies that would protect the donor’s interests.47 
                                                                                                                 
 38. Drabiak-Syed, supra note 15, at 210; see also Marchant, supra note 20, at 166. 
 39. See Marchant, supra note 20, at 166.  
 40. See id.  
 41. See id.  
 42. See discussion supra Part II.  
 43. See Marchant, supra note 20, at 166; see also Pensabene, supra note 3, at 642 
(“Providing human subjects with adequate protections is crucial because genetic material 
contains the most personal date regarding an individual’s physical identity.”); Drabiak-Syed, 
supra note 15, at 216.  
 44. See Pensabene, supra note 3, at 642-44.  
 45. See id.  
 46. See id.  
 47. See id. at 647.  
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III. Informed Consent Among Indigenous Populations 
When it comes to many indigenous populations, the problem with the 
individual approach is that it emphasizes a split of the biological material 
from the person as soon as it is removed and therefore gives the person no 
rights in the now separate material.48 That separation often affects 
indigenous populations’ rights over something that they still consider to be 
part of themselves, even if it is no longer technically part of their body.49 In 
the end, then, this separation is a form of alienation of both the self and the 
community because it takes a part of their very essence away from them 
with no regard for how such an action can impact their sense of personal 
and communal completeness.50 Perhaps a better definition of informed 
consent is one recognizing that cultural sensitivity is an important piece of 
the cultural competency aspect of informed consent.  
Fergus MacKay, Senior Counsel for the Legal and Human Rights 
Programme at the Forest Peoples’ Programme, suggests defining “informed 
consent” as “the consensus/consent of indigenous people determined in 
accordance with their customary laws and practices.”51 
MacKay’s definition might help address misuse of indigenous genetic 
materials, a problem that is neither insignificant nor localized. Misuse has 
happened throughout the world, particularly in the area of patents that 
includes the mapping of populations’ genomes around the world.52 Native 
American tribes have also been affected domestically, which culminated in 
the widely debated Havasupai decision.53 This decision illustrates the lack 
of informed consent applied to indigenous research participants and the 
cultural misunderstandings behind it.  
A. Pre-Havasupai Cases 
 In 1958, the federal government devoted significant energy to the field 
of genetics in its effort to advance atomic research during the Cold War, 
and considered Native Americans ideal research subjects.54 “Project 
                                                                                                                 
 48. See Drabiak-Syed, supra note 15, at 221. 
 49. See id. at 221-22.  
 50. See id. at 224.  
 51. Fergus MacKay, Indigenous Peoples’ Right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent 
and the World Bank’s Extractive Industries Review, 4 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 43, 49 
(2004) (discussing the meaning of free, prior informed consent).  
 52. See Jacobs et al., supra note 1, at 684.  
 53. See Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008).  
 54. See Ron J. Whitener, Research in Native American Communities in the Genetics 
Age: Can the Federal Data Sharing Statute of General Applicability and Tribal Control of 
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Chariot” was designed to create a seaport near the Inupiat town of Point 
Hope, Alaska.55 The United States government engaged in environmental 
experiments with radiation by releasing radioactive substances near the 
town.56 The purpose was to see how the indigenous population reacted to 
the radiation; specifically, to see if they had genetically higher metabolisms 
that would help them in adverse weather conditions.57 The Inupiat, 
however, were not told about the study, did not give consent, and did not 
find out about the research until 1992.58 
The case of the Nuu-Chah-Nulth of British Columbia is also worth 
noting. There, indigenous participants gave blood samples to a researcher 
so that he could study rheumatoid arthritis.59 The researcher moved to the 
University of Utah and then to Oxford University, taking the blood samples 
with him.60 He then used the blood samples for his own purposes and 
loaned them out to other researchers—none of which was addressed in the 
informed consent agreements that the indigenous participants signed.61 
“When the Nuu-Chah-Nulth discovered” what had happened, “they 
demanded” the return of their samples, but the tribe did not look favorably 
on genetic research again.62 Canada later revised its policy concerning 
informed consent for future uses of data samples.63 
A similar situation occurred in Papua New Guinea, where a cell line 
from a Hagahai man was patented in the United States.64 The Hagahai were 
in the middle of a malaria outbreak and sought medical assistance from an 
anthropologist, who collected extensive data including blood samples.65 
The blood samples showed that the Hagahai carried a benign T-cell 
leukemia lymphoma virus.66 The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office issued 
the patent to the American government three years later.67 In response to 
                                                                                                                 
Research Be Reconciled?, 15 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 217, 229 (2010) (noting research abuses 
among Native American and Alaskan Native communities).  
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. at 229-30. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See id.  
 59. See id. at 234-35. 
 60. See id. at 235.  
 61. See id.  
 62. Id. 
 63. See id.  
 64. See MacIntosh, supra note 30, at 227. 
 65. See id. 
 66. See id.  
 67. See id. at 228.  
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the public outcry that followed, the National Health Institute claimed that 
the patent had met all the requirements and that the Hagahai did not own 
their donated materials.68 
There was a similar case in Panama, where the National Health Institute 
filed a patent application for a T-cell line developed from a Guaymi 
woman.69 U.S. officials claimed that the woman had given her consent to 
the taking of her DNA.70 However, the question is not whether she gave 
consent, but whether she gave informed consent, because consent without a 
full understanding and disclosure of what she consented to in that research 
is not truly informed consent. The international condemnation led to the 
withdrawal of the patent application.71 Nevertheless, the DNA was not 
returned to its people.72  
The Guaymi woman’s case, and many others, establish that there is a 
significant history of misuse when it comes to indigenous populations’ 
genetic materials. Most of these cases appear to have gone relatively 
unnoticed, as did the misuse, until the Havasupai brought it to public 
attention.  
B. The Havasupai Decision 
A leading complaint in the lack of indigenous populations’ informed 
consent is the issue of stigma.73 Genetic research places tribal DNA under 
close scrutiny, and anything found has the power to reflect on tribal 
populations themselves.74 This stigma is highly pertinent for Native 
American tribes when considered in the context of their long history of 
discrimination.75 Native Americans may not view blood the same way as 
our research or patent systems do. Many consider blood to be “a sacred link 
to the tribe’s ancestors that retains its sacred status well after removal from 
the body.”76  
                                                                                                                 
 68. See id.  
 69. See Nancy Kremers, Speaking with a Forked Tongue in the Global Debate on 
Traditional Knowledge and Genetic Resources: Are U.S. Intellectual Property Law and 
Policy Really Aimed at Meaningful Protection for Native American Cultures?, 15 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1, 32 (2004) (discussing patent dilemmas in indigenous 
populations’ genetic materials).  
 70. See id. 
 71. See id. at 32-33.  
 72. See id. at 33.  
 73. See Pensabene, supra note 3, at 650.  
 74. See id. 
 75. See id.  
 76. Id. at 653.  
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In effect, blood and DNA contain the very essence of the tribe.77 
Mishandling and misusing it is a disruption to more than just one person—it 
is a disruption to the entire community and its spiritual well-being.78 
Havasupai Tribe v. Arizona Board of Regents79 is the best illustration of 
the disruption misuse can have. The case probably demonstrates the most 
famous example of failed informed consent within an indigenous 
population. There, the Havasupai tribe gave blood samples voluntarily to 
Arizona State University (ASU), but specified that the samples were only to 
be used for research on diabetes.80 They later discovered that ASU 
researchers also used the samples in studies on “schizophrenia, inbreeding, 
and theories about ancient-human population migrations . . . .”81 This last 
area of study is particularly offensive to the Havasupai because they believe 
that their people came from the Grand Canyon.82 The Havasupai claimed 
that the University had broken its vow of confidentiality and had given their 
private genetic information to third parties, including more than one 
doctoral candidate for their dissertations.83  
Havasupai warrants further investigation of the informed consent 
process involved. The Tribal Council received a letter from the lead 
researcher that described the project as relating to diabetes and that purpose 
was emphasized in person as well.84 When the researchers began to take 
blood samples, they again explained that the purpose of the project was to 
study diabetes.85 They also provided consent forms to the participants, and 
the participants all indicated that they understood, but what they signed 
identified the purpose of the research as “to study the causes of 
behavioral/medical disorders.”86 Behavioral disorders were not mentioned 
orally, but those forms initiated the unauthorized use of the samples for 
purposes other than diabetes.87 Furthermore, the Havasupai must have 
believed that the samples would be returned to them because, given their 
beliefs about genetic material and its connection to themselves, they would 
                                                                                                                 
 77. See Drabiak-Syed, supra note 15, at 213. 
 78. See id. at 214.  
 79. 204 P.3d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). 
 80. See Havasupai v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063, 1066 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008). 
 81. See id. at 1067.  
 82. See id. 
 83. See id. at 1067-68. 
 84. See Drabiak-Syed, supra note 15, at 180.  
 85. See id. 
 86. Id. (quoting STEPHEN HART, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT CONCERNING THE MEDICAL 
GENETICS PROJECT AT HAVASUPAI, app. A at 23 (2003)).  
 87. See Drabiak-Syed, supra note 15, at 181. 
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not have agreed to part with it otherwise. Yet no evidence supports that the 
topic of their return was raised—probably because neither party thought it 
was necessary. The misunderstanding on that one topic alone further 
affirms the need for culturally competent informed consent.  
When the project was handed over to another researcher, he did not 
know that written consent was needed and followed only an oral consent 
process.88 There, too, he identified the purpose as a study focusing only on 
diabetes.89 Other discrepancies in the research process have come to light as 
well. As it happened, another researcher who was interested in 
schizophrenia began to study the blood samples for that purpose, and began 
collecting samples from the tribe a full summer before the Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) approved a project on schizophrenia.90  
A key piece of informed consent is that it is obtained in advance of 
official authorization.91 This timeframe assures that the process also 
provides indigenous participants enough time to consider the relevant 
information and request more if needed.92 Sometimes it will be necessary to 
negotiate an agreement that is acceptable to both researchers and 
participants, and give the indigenous population the right to participate as 
they choose and obtain any information or advice that they require.93 That 
process was bypassed here. Furthermore, the information was supposed to 
be private, and the participants were assured that it would be—yet the 
researcher provided open access to the samples to ASU and non-affiliated 
researchers who were studying a myriad of topics.94 
In analyzing the district court’s decision against the plaintiff tribe, 
Professor Katherine Drabiak-Syed claims that the court entirely failed to 
consider what blood and genetic research mean to the Havasupai tribe.95 
She noted that while the tribal participants signed the consent as the court 
concluded, the researcher defendants used fraudulent statements to get the 
samples.96  
                                                                                                                 
 88. See id.  
 89. See id.  
 90. See id. at 181-82. 
 91. See MacKay, supra note 51, at 56.  
 92. See id.  
 93. See id. at 57.  
 94. Drabiak-Syed, supra note 15, at 183. 
 95. Id. at 186. 
 96. Id. at 188. 
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The court did place a significant amount of weight on that consent, but 
the question is whether it was informed consent.97 The researchers did not 
communicate to the participants the full extent of what would be done with 
their samples, and so the participants did not have the information they 
needed to give consent.98 They would likely not have consented to the 
complete disregard of tribal privacy rights that came from sharing the 
samples with third parties. 
The parties eventually reached a settlement agreement, which included 
damages and the return of the blood samples and all related documents.99 
The University enacted some changes to its IRB samples as well, including 
consideration of ongoing research that uses blood samples, and they now 
provide a list to the tribe of anyone who received their samples.100 
C. Cultural Misunderstandings  
It is telling to examine the researchers’ reactions to the Havasupai 
controversy. In interviews with one of the researchers, the tribe was 
described as “hysterical” in the face of “doing good science.”101 
Recognition for indigenous beliefs is conspicuously absent in those 
comments—as is respect. Many indigenous populations simply do not hold 
their blood and genetic information as items of scientific value, but rather 
as part of themselves and their people.102 The Havasupai case and medical 
researchers’ initial reaction to it have brought to light the need for a revised 
framework.  
Secondary research—when biological materials are used subsequent to 
the primary research—is a particular problem in current informed consent 
procedures.103 IRBs do not assess harm if the information collected is 
private and provides no opportunity to match the data to its donor.104 If the 
samples are completely anonymized the secondary research on them does 
                                                                                                                 
 97. See id. at 190. 
 98. Id. at 191. 
 99. Id. at 195. 
 100. See id.  
 101. Id. at 196 (quoting Howard Fischer, Havasupai Blood Lawsuit Reinstated, ARIZ. 
DAILY SUN (Nov. 28, 2008), http://azdailysun.com/news/havasupai-blood-lawsuit-reinstated/ 
article_2921c286-4454-57eb-926b-11e795134f8f.html; David Usborne, Blood Feud in the 
Grand Canyon, INDEPENDENT (London) (Apr. 22, 2010), http://www.independent.co.uk/ 
news/world/americas/blood-feud-in-the-grand-canyon-1951972.html).  
 102. Drabiak-Syed, supra note 15, at 196. 
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not violate current human genetic research standards, which occurred with 
the Havasupai.105  
The data is at risk of being identifiable because researchers can make 
sweeping generalizations about a population based on those samples that 
affect an entire tribe.106 For example, the researcher in Havasupai claimed 
that the samples were anonymized, but she did label them all with the prefix 
“HAV”—which effectively identified the Havasupai tribe.107 Even when 
identifiers are removed, participants can still feel stigmatization and 
spiritual harm because their genetic material can still be used to attribute 
characteristics or genetic history to their the tribe as a whole, even without a 
personal identifier, and that affects more than just the individual 
participant.108  
There is also an inherent problem when a participant is denied the right 
to discontinue participation in research. When the Havasupai realized their 
DNA was being misused, they sought to withdraw from the study and were 
denied that right.109  
Such a denial can have lasting effects to the tribal culture. Cultural harm 
is such a significant lasting effect, and to indigenous populations, the risks 
of harm include any practice that “disparage[s] their spiritual traditions, 
historical narratives, or traditional beliefs.”110 It is possible that researchers 
and IRBs omitted a concern for cultural harm because it is not a harm they 
themselves would conceptualize as real.111  
For example, researchers from a university might not hold a community-
centered view of property as do many indigenous populations. Indigenous 
views of property may not be individual-centered, as American law 
favors.112 Moreover, indigenous property systems may contain specific 
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perspectives about resources that have a sacred spirituality.113 Indigenous 
populations often have a different view of the relationship between human 
beings and the environment, which differs from the Western system of 
property that asserts individual rights and actions against other 
individuals.114  
Indigenous populations also tend to have a communal approach of family 
and social ties in their property frameworks.115 Cultural harm is considered 
a direct attack on cultural survival.116 That harm is impermissible because 
“Native peoples have political and cultural rights in association with their 
distinctive status and relationship with their traditional lands.”117 It goes 
without saying that indigenous peoples also have the right to preserve that 
relationship from harm.118  
Indigenous populations frequently consider themselves shepherds of the 
land and responsible for various spiritual duties.119 Their duties include 
responsibilities to their “cultural property,” which has been defined as 
“‘everything that belongs to the distinct identity of a people,’ which 
‘includes inheritances from the past and from nature, such as human 
remains, the natural features of the landscape, and naturally-occurring 
species of plants and animals with which a people has long been 
connected.’”120  
Harming that knowledge or way of life has lasting consequences on their 
cultural survival; cultural harm and concepts of “sacred,” however, have not 
been considered a viable basis for damages in American courts.121 Indeed, 
intellectual property paradigms are traditionally lacking in any 
consideration of cultural harm,122 and indigenous cultural property is not 
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safe from misappropriation.123 For these reasons, indigenous peoples are 
often distrustful of biomedical research.124 
This distrust was more than apparent in the Havasupai tribe. Havasupai 
teachings say that all genetic and biological materials must be intact in 
order for a tribal member to cross into the next world.125 Imagine how it 
affected the tribe when five Havasupais died from diabetes while the case 
was being argued;126 the tribe believed that those people could not cross 
into the next world unless their blood samples were returned.127 That belief 
was not likely one that a non-Havasupai researcher considered, which 
explains why the university researchers did not address it in their informed 
consent procedure. Havasupai as well as the other aforementioned cases 
demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of both culturally competent 
informed consent and many indigenous belief systems.  
IV. Tribal Sovereignty in the Context of Informed Consent 
The above concerns arise primarily because researchers do not take into 
account the doctrine of tribal sovereignty. There are 566 federally 
recognized tribes in the United States.128 The status of these tribes was 
determined in three seminal cases: Johnson v. Macintosh, Cherokee Nation 
v. Georgia, and Worcester v. Georgia.129 In these cases, Chief Justice 
Marshall established that tribes are separate, but dependent, nations, limited 
only in their ability to convey land and transact with foreign 
governments.130 The state that hosts a tribal nation is not permitted to 
interfere with tribal affairs in any other respect.131 In Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, Justice Marshall relegated the tribes to “domestic dependent 
nations”, but he also granted them some recognition as “states”.132  
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Even that recognition, however, soon began to fail. An additional 
limitation on tribal sovereignty presented itself in Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe, where the Supreme Court held that tribes have no criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians, basing its decision entirely on the domestic 
dependent status of the tribes.133 This case marked the beginning of the end 
for any recognition as a state previously held by the tribes. The line of 
judicial opinions following includes Montana v. United States, in which the 
Court held that tribes do not have the power to regulate fish and wildlife on 
their own reservations and which limited tribal jurisdiction to “internal 
relations”.134 In the end, the tribes have sovereignty at the discretion of 
Congress, and the veneer of tribal sovereignty is quite thin in American 
jurisprudence.135 
The veneer may be thin, but it exists nonetheless. Federal Indian policy 
promotes government-to-government cooperation between tribal and 
federal governments.136 Any undertakings that could potentially affect tribal 
rights or resources should be subjected to standards of tribal sovereignty 
and respect.137 Generally, the federal government and its departments are 
expected to consult tribal authorities before taking any action that could 
affect the tribes, assess the impact of any proposed programs or activities, 
and present viable solutions to address the needs of the tribes.138 Federal 
agencies are also asked to encourage the tribes to design and implement 
their own policies in order to maintain tribal authority and objectives.139 
The question that has not been sufficiently addressed by either tribal or 
American courts, in any framework, concerns tribal sovereignty over 
intangible rights, like intellectual property rights in biotechnology. The 
federal government’s policy, however, is consistent with accommodating 
indigenous beliefs and needs in modern research paradigms. Many scholars, 
including Professor Rebecca Tsosie and Professor Katherine Drabiak-Syed, 
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have discussed the disparity. Even though established principles of tribal 
sovereignty specifically recognize independent tribal decision-making and 
mandate consultation with the tribes for anything that might affect them—
such as their participation in biomedical research—culturally competent 
informed consent remains unaddressed.  
V. Obtaining Culturally Competent Informed Consent 
Indeed, it would be difficult for anyone to argue that participation in 
biomedical research and obtaining genetic information from an indigenous 
population do not affect that population and/or that donor. Therefore, it is 
difficult to deny the importance of informed consent since it protects 
indigenous interests while minimizing harm.140 Moreover, it provides 
indigenous participants with a means of protecting their ability to realize 
the benefits of the research project impacting them.141  
Unfortunately, obtaining informed consent in the first place can be 
difficult because some risks cannot be accurately foreseen or described 
even if they are known.142 It is more difficult to predict intangible harms 
that are particularly relevant to indigenous populations, such as dignitary 
harms and cultural harms.143 Several scholars have provided 
recommendations that present sound opportunities for increasing cultural 
awareness of informed consent with indigenous populations. The following 
recommendations represent a basic synthesized framework of the most 
plausible and effective recommendations from scholars such as Professors 
Joan McGregor, Morris Foster, Bette Jacobs, Ron Whitener, and Debra 
Harry, as well as from biomedical ethicist Richard Sharp and attorney Le’a 
Malia Kanehe. What follows is the author’s interpretation of an effective 
methodology for a culturally competent informed consent processes.  
(1) Community Participation and Control. Progress requires cooperation, 
and the best way to ensure community cooperation is to make them an 
active part of the research.144 Community representatives, for example, are 
much better suited to identify potential harms than an outsider to the 
community would be.145 This is a measure that takes cultural differences 
                                                                                                                 
 140. See MacKay, supra note 51, at 50. 
 141. See id.  
 142. See Sharp & Foster, supra note 108, at 171. 
 143. See id.  
 144. See McGregor, supra note 4, at 366.  
 145. See Sharp & Foster, supra note 108, at 174. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
248 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
 
 
into account and conveys respect for those differences by allowing 
indigenous perspectives to be heard.146 
Community participation will also make informed consent a more 
holistically informed process. For instance, secondary research should be 
addressed with the indigenous community members. If the research is 
sought for renewal or a secondary purpose, indigenous consultation is 
important.147 Part of the informed consent process should also deal with 
mechanisms for reporting findings to participants.148 Certainly, participants 
deserve to be kept up to date on the research that they are hoping will 
benefit them. And certainly, the participants should be able to view the 
findings and discuss possible dissemination to the public before the results 
are actually disseminated to the public.149 
Community participation and consent has the benefit of protecting 
indigenous cultures and helping to ensure their survival.150 It also has the 
benefit of giving researchers a sure path to successful projects—after all, 
indigenous populations know themselves and their communities better than 
anyone else ever will, and their help and knowledge are vital to making 
progress.151 
(2) Indigenous Institutional Review Boards and Research Codes. 
Indigenous control and understanding of their resources is what makes 
having their own IRBs important. Professor Ron Whitener argues that 
indigenous peoples should create their own research systems and include 
indigenous participation in them.152 He notes that indigenous research codes 
should assert a property right over the data collected, and therefore a right 
to regulate how it is used.153 Researchers seeking to work with indigenous 
populations should also sign documents indicating that they understand the 
data belongs to the participant community.154  
Currently, the U.S. Indian Health Service has its own IRBs for any 
research that one of its facilities plans to undertake, but they also extend 
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their research services, including IRBS, to Native American tribes.155 The 
Indian Health Service may be better equipped to understand indigenous 
research concerns than many other government organizations, but they are 
still not as close to the community issues as the community members 
themselves.  
In 1996, the Navajo Nation set up its own IRB, called the Navajo Nation 
Human Research Review Board (NNHRRB).156 The Board implemented a 
twelve-step process that investigators must undergo, including community 
participation, review of data before publication, disclosure of results to the 
tribe, and granting of data possession to the tribe.157 The Navajo have also 
specified that they intend to retain jurisdiction over their own intellectual 
property and any researchers within their borders.158 No researcher is 
permitted to begin working unless s/he has acknowledged that fact.159  
The Cherokee Nation has also established an IRB, and other tribes have 
taken similar measures.160 Some tribes have also tried to regulate genetic 
research on their own lands.161 For example, the Hopi have a Cultural 
Preservation Office, and the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes 
enacted a Cultural Resource Protection Ordinance in 1995.162  
Community participation should include training indigenous peoples in 
genetic research, not only to help with the research, but also to ensure that 
they fully understand the science and why it is being performed in their 
community.163 This training will increase the effectiveness of all informed 
consent measures and will foster a two-way street of communication 
between science and culture.164 In effect, indigenous researchers should 
make sure that the research will benefit the indigenous community and 
should explain to the community what the science and the data will mean 
for them.165 
Of course, non-native scientists must participate in the two-way street as 
well, and that requires some training on working with indigenous 
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participants. Professor Bette Jacobs and her colleagues suggest five critical 
areas that should be conveyed to researchers working with indigenous 
participants: (1) accountability to the indigenous population, (2) allowing 
the indigenous population to have control, (3) recognizing that the 
indigenous population has an interest in the data and the genetic materials 
used in the research, (4) encouraging indigenous community members to 
participate as researchers themselves, and (5) remembering that this is 
going to be a long-term cross-cultural relationship with people who have 
the same right to self-determination as does anyone else.166 
(3) Data Repositories. Professor Whitener suggests that creating an 
indigenous data repository will vest control over research samples in 
indigenous peoples.167 Such a repository will require that any data collected 
would remain housed with the population who donated it, which will also 
effectively restrict access to it.168 Through such a repository, anyone who 
wanted to gain access to the data contained within will have go to directly 
to the indigenous community who hosts it for permission.  
(4) Compliance. Researchers need to understand what compliance with 
indigenous research codes and other requirements entails, and they need to 
understand the consequences of a violation. Including a statement of 
compliance in any research agreement may also provide contractual 
remedies if deliberately structured to do so. A similar statement should be 
included in any published works that are based on the research.169 That 
statement will provide editors and the entire peer review process with a 
standard for enforcement and will protect both research participants and 
their communities.170  
In conclusion, these four recommendations are a summation of the most 
workable recommendations from scholars in this area of research. In one 
combined system, they provide a strong foundation for supplying 
indigenous research participants with more control over their own genetic 
materials. Additionally, they provide the beginnings of a new relationship 
between researchers and indigenous research participants, one that will put 
them on equal ground and mandate respectful treatment in all informed 
consent agreements. 
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As genetic research gains importance and momentum, the role of 
indigenous populations in that research will also rise. Until now, it has been 
easy to operate in our traditional framework of research and informed 
consent, and our case law has supported it.171 This framework, however, 
has been proven time and time again to be incompatible with many 
indigenous peoples’ belief systems.172 The Havasupai’s case illustrates the 
failure of mainstream informed consent when applied to an indigenous 
research population, and the general lack of case law indicates all too 
clearly that recognition of the disparity in American jurisprudence is slow.  
Havasupai also demonstrates the decline of recognition for Native 
American tribal sovereignty and tribal rights. This is a state of affairs that 
not only undermines a key principle of our jurisprudence regarding tribal 
relations, but simultaneously defeats the purpose of bioethics and collapses 
potentially beneficial research relationships—which, in the end, nullifies 
any progress that could be made in genetic research involving these 
indigenous populations.  
The most effective way of redressing the problem is to invest indigenous 
research populations with more control over their own genetic materials 
through means such as indigenous research liaisons and indigenous 
research codes. To do that, principles of tribal sovereignty must first be 
renewed, followed, and respected. Genetic research has proven benefits, but 
it will not progress with indigenous research participants if those 
participants—and their way of life—are not treated with respect. 
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